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FINDING INVENTION 
OSKAR LIIVAK?
ABSTRACT
One of the biggest problems plaguing modern patent law is its inability to provide pre-
dictable and clear exclusive rights. We would improve clarity by simply following the patent 
statute and extending exclusion only to “the patented invention.” That suggestion, as rea-
sonable as it may sound, is actually quite radical to the dominant patent law orthodoxy. It 
is not even clear under the dominant patent law orthodoxy what it would mean to limit 
patent scope to the invention, but it is generally presumed that it must lead to unacceptably 
narrow patents. Thus, even if it provides clarity, the invention is thought to be just too nar-
row a concept to provide enough protection for inventors.  
 This Article takes up that worry and shows that the invention is actually broader than 
many think. While still providing predictable and clear patent boundaries, it can provide 
much of the protection that many incorrectly fear would be lacking in an invention-based 
patent system. Interestingly, this Article does not need to create this theory of the invention 
anew. It already exists; we just need to find it. For the first 100 years of U.S. patent law, the 
invention was the focal point of most cases. Those early cases provide a much-needed seed 
stock from which to redevelop an understanding of the invention. What emerges from that 
historical exploration is a concept with deep precedential support and surprisingly sophisti-
cated internal structure that can tackle our current challenge of providing both clear and 
adequate protection to inventors. Surprisingly, the invention tethers patent scope to the pa-
tent disclosure while still explaining the wide range of patent scope decisions and even al-
lowing scope to extend to after-arising technology in predictable ways.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Patent law’s grand challenge is to grant patents that promote the 
“progress of science and useful arts.”1 That means both providing ad-
equate protection for inventors and administering that protection 
efficiently. There is a growing consensus that modern patent law has 
failed at this challenge.2 In their book, Patent Failure, Michael 
Meurer and James Bessen reach exactly this worrisome conclusion. 
In diagnosing this grim condition, Meurer and Bessen lay blame on 
the patent system’s inability to provide clear public notice of patent 
boundaries.3 They argue that the doctrines that determine patent 
scope are “unpredictable.”4 Patent scope has become what the Su-
preme Court long ago feared: “a nose of wax which may be turned 
and twisted in any direction.”5 Meurer and Bessen note that today, 
“[t]here is thus no reliable way of determining patent boundaries 
short of litigation. . . .”6 The crux of their argument focuses on the 
significant costs associated with these ill-defined patent boundaries.7
They conclude that, “the main goal of [patent] reform should be to 
improve patent notice.”8
 In recent work, I identified a critical conceptual misstep that has 
contributed to this public notice failure.9 Modern patent law has mis-
takenly allowed patent claims to be seen as direct delineations of a 
patent’s boundaries rather than as linguistic tools for “pointing out 
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant re-
gards as his invention.”10 In other words, we have lost sight of the 
invention—the substantive technical solution created by the inven-
tor. That misstep has, to a large extent, caused the “fuzzy bounda-
ries” lamented by Meurer and Bessen.11 Claim drafting has become a 
                                                                                                                            
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 10 (2008); DAN L. BURK &
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009);  
see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 1-10 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 3. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 10. 
 4. Id.
 5. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886). 
 6. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 10. 
 7. See id. at 25-26. 
 8. Id. at 236. 
 9. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 11. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 10. 
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relatively unconstrained game of requesting valuable intellectual re-
al estate rather than an exercise in concisely delineating the sub-
stantive invention. The invention, once understood as a substantive 
concept, can both constrain and define patent exclusion.12
 Though a focus on the substantive, technical invention as a limit 
for patent exclusion surely has common sense appeal, many question 
whether the invention can shoulder the responsibility of defining 
both adequate and clear boundaries.13 Most notably, there is confu-
sion over the exact content of the substantive invention.14
 For some, the invention is a very narrow concept tied directly to 
the actual physical thing made by the inventor.15 That narrow defini-
tion can provide well-defined boundaries, but many object, arguing 
that, though clear, it would provide far too narrow protection.16 In 
particular, such a rule would prevent patent protection from reaching 
after-arising technology—a type of patent scope that, though contro-
versial, has been available in some form for quite some time. For oth-
ers, the invention is a broader concept encompassing some more ab-
stract idea behind the actual thing created by the inventor. Though 
such broader protection could be adequate and indeed can easily 
reach after-arising technology, its more abstract nature makes it un-
likely to be capable of well-defined, predictable boundaries. 
 Both of these two seemingly contradictory views appear in the 
courts.17 Most important, the Supreme Court has, in some cases, de-
scribed the invention narrowly, focusing on the thing built by the in-
ventor, while at other times the Court has focused more on the ab-
stract principles behind the thing built by the inventor.18 Indeed, pa-
tent scope decisions by courts cover a huge range, varying from case 
to case in what appears to be an incoherent fashion. Patent law 
grants very broad patent scope in some instances, while in seemingly 
similar cases it grants little or no scope.19        
 With such confusion and apparent contradiction, the invention 
hardly appears to be a good vehicle for clearly defining patent bound-
aries.20 Yet this Article argues that the invention is in fact a far more 
coherent, predictable concept than generally thought. It can provide 
                                                                                                                            
 12. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 13. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Liivak, supra note 9, at 6-31. 
 15. See infra notes 34-76 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
 17. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
 18. See id.
 19. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 26-27. 
 20. Indeed, some have given up using it as workable definition of patent exclusion, 
while others go further and embrace the full range of possible definitions of the invention 
(and therefore exclusion) as a feature of the system, arguing that its inherent vagueness 
offers courts wide policy latitude to tailor patent scope. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of 
Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2011). 
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much needed “predictability” while still granting “an appropriate re-
ward.”21 In a sense it possesses the clarity and concreteness of the 
narrow vision with breadth and protection afforded by the more ab-
stract view. When properly understood, the invention can explain why 
some patentees receive a lot of scope and why some do not, including 
explaining the varying reach of patents into after-arising technology. 
 Interestingly, this Article does not need to create this concept of 
the invention afresh—it already exists. The notion of the invention 
presented here pervaded patent law throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. Well-known cases, such as O’Reilly v. Morse,22 Winans v. Den-
mead,23 Tilghman v. Proctor,24 and the Incandescent Lamp Bulb Pa-
tent case,25 are still cited today and taught as foundational patent law 
cases.26 And though dealing with technologies that surely appear 
primitive, they articulated a vision of the invention that was any-
thing but pedestrian. As developed there, the invention was not any 
one particular embodiment disclosed in the patent, nor was it a more 
abstract “idea” behind that embodiment. Instead, the invention was 
best understood as the set of embodiments disclosed in the patent. 
And, just as importantly, those cases also developed a sophisticated 
understanding of how embodiments could be disclosed. They showed 
how, in some circumstances, inventors could disclose (and thus claim) 
embodiments with clarity and specificity that would later use after-
arising technology. 27 I describe this alternatively as a functional dis-
closure or a trans-technological disclosure.                
 The key to the internal structure of the invention is that they are 
not all the same. Akin to the spectrum of authorship in copyright 
that spans high and low authorship,28 the invention in patent law 
spans broad and narrow inventorship.29 Some inventors, for reasons 
discussed below, can and do invent (and disclose) a large number of 
                                                                                                                            
 21. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 237. 
 22. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
 23. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854). 
 24. 102 U.S. 707 (1881). 
 25. 159 U.S. 465 (1895), aff’g Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co, 40 F. 21 
(W.D. Pa. 1889). 
 26. See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW (5th ed. 2011); ROBERT 
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS (5th ed. 2011). 
27.    See infra notes 103-26 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of 
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1870 (1990) (“We have now, as we have 
long had, two kinds of copyright: in high authorship works, such as novels and narrative 
histories, copyright protects the authorial presence within the work; in low authorship 
works, such as telephone directories and compilations of stock quotations, copyright pro-
tects the labor and resources invested in the work’s creation.”). 
 29. See Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of 
Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177 (2007) (describing an extreme case of narrow in-
ventorship: the purification and isolation of naturally occurring gene sequences). 
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related embodiments. This is broad inventorship, and the inventor’s 
patent can cover this relatively broad set of things. In contrast, some 
inventors cannot invent and disclose broadly. This is narrow inven-
torship, and having disclosed just one or a very limited number of 
embodiments, the scope of their patent cannot extend beyond that 
narrowly defined set. Patent scope is simply a function of the number 
and variety of embodiments invented and disclosed. When defined in 
this way, the invention is not only uniform and predictable, but also 
able to explain and predict a wide range of patent scope decisions. 
 In addition to explaining the variations in patent scope generally, 
the invention can also explain the varying reach of a patent scope 
into after-arising technology. An inventor who understands the inner 
workings of a particular embodiment can generalize other solutions 
that are variations on the particular embodiment.  In describing 
these alternatives via specific yet functional language the disclosure 
can teach embodiments that will utilize after-arising technology. 
Such generalized, often functionally defined embodiments enable to-
day’s disclosures to teach future persons of skill to build embodi-
ments using after-arising technology. Importantly, though styles of 
claiming have been examined in the literature, there has been far 
less examination of the necessarily earlier question of modes of dis-
closure. And though functional claiming is an emerging topic of aca-
demic interest,30 this Article aims to address the topic of functional 
disclosure. Though critically important for reaching after-arising 
technology, such disclosures (and the broad patent scope they impli-
cate) need to be closely regulated as they can, if not carefully re-
viewed, be easily abused.     
 The following Parts further examine these issues. Part II explores 
the contours of the invention and develops the historic understanding 
of the invention as the set of disclosed embodiments. The Part shows 
that a broad invention can be disclosed in two related ways. An in-
ventor can explicitly disclose alternative embodiments by elaborating 
the structural details of these alternatives; this, of course, contrib-
utes to broad patent scope. In addition, the inventor can disclose 
what I describe as a generalized embodiment that, though not de-
fined with the same explicit structural detail as some embodiments, 
is nonetheless still detailed enough for any person of skill, without 
more, to practice the invention. As will be shown, that later method 
of disclosure will be critical for understanding how patents can dis-
close embodiments today that only become a reality in the future. 
Those generalized embodiments and their functional disclosure allow 
patent scope to reach into after-arising technology.  
                                                                                                                            
 30. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional  
Claiming (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2117302, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117302. 
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 Part III explores the circumstances in which such broad protection 
is not available. The Part shows that though broad patent scope is 
available sometimes, it is not available for every invention or for eve-
ry aspect of every invention. Some inventors may only disclose one 
embodiment and their patent will be similarly narrow. Relatedly, for 
some inventions, some features of the invention cannot be general-
ized. For some parts of the invention, the inventor cannot provide 
alternatives; some features are essential. For example, though a pa-
tentee might disclose a large array of materials for constructing em-
bodiments of, say, a new tennis racket, she might disclose only one 
particular shape of the constituent parts. In that case, the invention 
is relatively broad as to material but quite narrow as to shape—it all 
depends on the embodiments disclosed.  
 Having outlined the general concept of narrow inventions, the 
Part proceeds to focus attention on one important such class of nar-
row inventions: found inventions. These are inventions that are cre-
ated using trial-and-error techniques; many of the screening tech-
niques in modern biotechnology are best seen as such trial-and-error 
techniques. When embodiments are found using these techniques, 
often inventors are quite limited in their ability to generalize other 
embodiments that will also work, and accordingly, such inventions 
are generally afforded only rather narrow claim scope. And that is 
entirely consistent with protecting the disclosed invention. In these 
areas, the invention is narrow. The Part applies these ideas to the 
controversial area of monoclonal antibody patents and concludes that 
the so called antibody exception is one clear example where today’s 
patent system allows claims that improperly extend well beyond the 
actual invention disclosed.  
 Part IV takes this concept of both broad and narrow aspects of in-
ventions and applies them to the knotty problem of after-arising 
technology. It shows that, contrary to conventional thinking, inven-
tors can disclose embodiments today that will only be created tomor-
row using after-arising technology. Disclosure of such embodiments 
depends on the careful use of functional language. The Part shows 
that the reach of patent scope into after-arising technology turns out 
to be just a variant of the broad inventorship described in Part II. 
 The bulk of the first four Parts of the Article focus on defining the 
content of the invention and showing that it, descriptively, can ex-
plain the varying landscape of patent scope decisions. Part V takes 
on the challenging task of addressing the normative arguments for 
limiting patent exclusion to the invention. It argues that such a limit 
reduces system costs by improving patent notice. Furthermore, it ar-
gues for the adequacy of the invention as a limit for patent scope. 
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II. THE INVENTION AS THE SET OF DISCLOSED EMBODIMENTS
 This Part explores the basic contours of the invention. Ultimately, 
it concludes that the invention should be viewed as the set of embod-
iments disclosed in the patent itself. To reach that understanding, 
the Part turns to patent history. By consulting a series of Supreme 
Court cases and treatises from the 1800s, this Part uncovers that 
era’s sophisticated understanding of the invention as the set of dis-
closed embodiments. That history shows that this definition is broad-
er than may be initially thought. In most cases, the invention is not 
limited to the exact thing physically built by the inventor. Generally, 
it is not even limited to any one particular embodiment disclosed in 
the patent. Instead, the concept of the invention developed during 
that time viewed the invention as the set of the disclosed embodi-
ments. There are a number of benefits to this vision. First, by tether-
ing the invention to things that are disclosed, patent law ensures the 
patent itself provides the objective evidence of the invention. This 
enables clarity and predictability. In addition, patent law allows em-
bodiments to be disclosed not just by explicitly mentioning them. By 
allowing disclosure through a generalized embodiment that defines 
the “principle of the invention,” the patentee can disclose a relatively 
broad set of embodiments, including embodiments that utilize after-
arising technology. Third and lastly, by maintaining a focus on em-
bodiments as the primitive unit of the invention, patent law tethers 
the invention to the concrete, tangible world of completed solutions 
that are ready to put into practice by “any person of skill.” That 
avoids the need to plumb more abstract, vague, and likely difficult 
notions of the “ideas” inherent in a patent.  
A. Limiting Patent Scope to the Disclosed Invention: An Uphill Battle 
Before laying out the case for limiting patent scope to the dis-
closed invention, it is worth noting that the conventional wisdom in 
patent law certainly does not consider the disclosed invention to be 
the limit of patent scope—notwithstanding the clear language of the 
statute.31 For example, a recent article relayed this conventional wis-
dom when it stated: 
[D]espite the black-letter rule that an inventor “can lawfully claim 
only what he has invented and described,” courts and the Patent 
Office typically allow patent claims that are of much broader scope 
than what is actually disclosed in a patent application. Specifical-
ly, a patent will usually disclose just one or a few “embodiments” of 
                                                                                                                            
 31. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
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the invention in the patent’s specification, but will often claim 
thousands of different embodiments in a claim.32 
Others make similar statements, noting that “[c]laims are frequently 
a far cry from what the inventor invented”33 and that the patent system 
“has always provided more in terms of patent scope than merely those 
embodiments expressly disclosed by the inventor in her application.”34   
    Others add to this by rationalizing that the invention is just too 
narrow to provide enough protection. Lemley and Burk cite Judge 
Learned Hand as stating that “a claim that covers only the thing in-
vented is a weak claim indeed.”35 And in their influential article on 
claim scope, Merges and Nelson add that: 
At first blush it might seem to make sense to limit the rights of a 
patentee to only those embodiments of the invention she has dis-
closed in her specification, i.e., those that she has actually created 
at the time the patent application is filed. But imitators would 
soon find some minor variation over the disclosed embodiments 
. . . . Such a rule would soon render patents useless.36 
 One of the leading casebooks similarly chimes in that “[i]f courts 
strictly limit the scope of patent protection to the specific examples 
disclosed in the specification, competitors could readily circumvent 
the patent through minor changes in design.”37 Similarly, a recent 
article discussed fears that a “rule limiting patent claims to the em-
                                                                                                                            
 32. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 356 (2010) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1854)). 
 33. Janice M. Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 895, 899 (1999) (quot-
ing an email from Judge Giles Rich). 
 34. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Require-
ment to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 651 (1998). 
 35. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 62. Judge Hand wrote:  
If the claims were limited to the “concise and exact terms” in which the specifi-
cations ordinarily describe a single example of the invention, few, if any, pa-
tents, would have value, for there are generally many variants well-known to 
the art, which will at once suggest themselves as practicable substitutes for the 
specific details of the machine or process so disclosed. It is the office of the 
claims to cover these, and it is usually exceedingly difficult, and sometimes im-
possible, to do so except in language that is to some degree “functional”; for ob-
viously it is impossible to enumerate all possible variants. 
Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 177 F.2d 583, 585 (2d Cir. 1949). In other 
words, Burk and Lemley were using the “thing invented” to refer only to the actual physi-
cal thing created by the inventor. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 62. As described 
below, the invention as used here (and as used in the patent statute) is much broader than 
this. In fact, Learned Hand, in the cited portion of Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt 
Chemical Works, makes clear that the invention should be something along the lines ar-
gued for here. See 177 F.2d at 585. It should include alternatives and variants conceived 
and reduced to practice (often just constructively) by the inventor.   
 36. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845 (1990). 
 37. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 459 (2d  
ed. 2003).   
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bodiments taught by the specification . . . would eviscerate patent 
incentives.”38 Even Chris Cotropia, who is otherwise one of the few 
people also pushing for recognition of a substantive notion of the in-
vention, worries that “[p]rotection over, at most, the . . . invention 
may not be enough . . . .”39 Not to be outdone, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has made statements along these lines. For ex-
ample, in Gemstar–TV Guide International, Inc. v. International 
Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit stated “[t]his court has ex-
pressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single 
embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being lim-
ited to that embodiment.”40 
 In short, arguing, as this Article does, that patent scope should 
not exceed the disclosed invention certainly appears to be an uphill 
battle. But some of the conflict may be due to loose usage of terminol-
ogy. First, some may refer to the invention or the actual invention 
when they are instead referring to the actual, physical thing built by 
the inventors.41 Ed Kitch, in his foundational article on the patent 
system, warned against making exactly that mistake.42 As used here, 
                                                                                                                            
 38. Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. 
 U. L. REV. 1211, 1228 (2012) (“Confining the patentee to the specific embodiments in  
the specification would mean that a pirate could change a few nuts and bolts and thereby  
avoid infringement.”). 
 39. Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 
1911 (2012). Cotropia argues for use of what he calls the external notion of the invention as 
a limit for literal claim scope. Id. at 1910. This, he argues (and I agree), will generate pro-
cedural efficiency and clarity for claim interpretation. See id. at 1910-13. And where literal 
claim scope is not sufficient, Cotropia would rely on the doctrine of equivalents to add ex-
clusive protection beyond the actual invention. Id. at 1911-13. As we rely more on the doc-
trine of equivalents, we will just be pushing the boundary uncertainty problem into that 
famously uncertain doctrine. See id. at 1912-13. I do not think that is advisable. All the 
clarity that is gained by relying on the actual invention is lost if ultimate claim scope de-
pends on the doctrine of equivalents. To get patent scope certainty we need to also limit the 
doctrine of equivalents to the objective evidence in the patent itself.  
 40. 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Phil-
lips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Gemstar-TV Guide, 383 
F.3d at 1366 (“Our precedent has emphasized that the disclosure in the written description 
of a single embodiment does not limit the claimed invention to the features described in the  
disclosed embodiment.”). 
 41. See cases cited supra note 40. 
 42. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 268 (1977) (“[T]he ‘hornbook’ rule is very misleading—the inventor may not claim 
more than he has invented, and the claim marks the outer bounds of his rights. We tend to 
think of an invention as the thing an inventor has made or accomplished, and the rule 
seems to imply the inventor is confined to that. But the rule is misleading, because the 
invention as claimed in the patent claims and the physical embodiment of the invention 
are two quite different things. ‘A claim is an abstraction and generalization of an indefi-
nitely large number of concrete, physical objects.’ Thus to illustrate from a nineteenth-
century case, an inventor could claim a process of separating fats into glycerine and stea-
ric, margaric and oleic acids through the use of heat, pressure, and water at any tempera-
ture and in any apparatus that would work.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting PETER D.  
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particular examples (whether actually reduced to practice or con-
structively reduced to practice in the specification) will be referred to 
as embodiments, while the complete set of those disclosed embodi-
ments will be generally referred to as the disclosed invention. Second, 
another misconception that may be fueling the above fears is the idea 
that a patent specification discloses only one embodiment.43 This is 
just not the case. As will be discussed in more detail below, patent 
specifications routinely can contain many, sometimes infinite,  
variations and alternative embodiments. Third, some may also  
mistakenly think that a specification discloses a small number of 
embodiments because they forgot or ignore that the patent specifica-
tion also contains the original claims.44 As made clear by the text of 
the disclosure statute,45 claim language is part of the specification,  
and as a result, it discloses (or at least helps disclose) a large number  
of embodiments.46 
      Nonetheless, even when these misconceptions and loose terminol-
ogy are accounted for, there still remains unease over limiting patent 
scope to the disclosed embodiments. First, there are worries that cop-
yists can too easily steal the heart of the invention while evading the 
patent scope with minor alterations. 47 Second, there are more specific 
worries that such a limit will foreclose certain types of patent scope.48 
For example, some are concerned that such a rule will also prevent 
the related ability of patents that reach into after-arising technolo-
gy.49 A central assumption of these worries is that, as noted above by 
Merges and Nelson, the “embodiments . . . disclosed in [a] specifica-
tion” are limited to “those that [were] actually created at the time the 
                                                                                                                            
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39 (1975)) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S.  
707 (1880))). 
 43. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1097 (2011). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 46. See Brief for Oskar Liivak as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 
12, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248), 
2009 WL 4616152. 
 47. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
 48. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 151, 165 (“[C]laims technically cannot capture the later-
developed technologies because to do so would require the claims to be interpreted as they 
are understood at some time after the filing date. ‘In fact, the quintessential example of an 
enforceable equivalent, after-arising technology, would always be unclaimable new matter 
for the patent as filed.’ ” (quoting Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1348, 
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
 49. See also Chiang, supra note 38, at 1237 (“But Liivak does not explain how his rule 
would avoid the pitfall of this approach, which is that later improvements cannot be taught 
at the time of the patentee’s initial conception, but at least some such later improvements 
(e.g., substituting plastic for wood) should be covered.”). 
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patent application is filed.”50 That assumption inherently forecloses 
the reach of disclosed embodiments into after-arising technology.51   
 As explored in much greater depth below, patent law has devel-
oped an understanding of the invention and the set of disclosed em-
bodiments that can, and in fact do, what many have assumed is not 
possible. The concept of the invention explored below shows that in-
ventors can disclose well-defined embodiments today that will only be 
built tomorrow with after-arising technologies. Understanding how 
that can be done is central to understanding the proper reach of the 
disclosed invention into after-arising technology. 
B. The Invention as the Inventor’s Completed Solution  
 The invention, as used here and as used in the patent statute, 
does not include assumptions about the novelty or obviousness of the 
thing created by the inventor. In other words, inventors often invent 
solutions that turn out to be old or obvious. These are still inventions, 
but importantly, they are not patentable inventions.52 In short, patent 
scope is the result of two determinations: first, what was invented, 
and second, what part of that invention is patentable? Though large-
ly ignored today, that framework has been part of patent law for at 
least the past 150 years.53
 The invention in patent law is the inventor’s own specific solution 
to some pressing problem (independent of its novelty or nonobvious-
ness). Importantly, that means that though it is correct to say that 
this Article argues that the disclosed invention forms an upper limit 
for patent scope, it should be emphasized that not every inventor 
necessarily receives patent scope that reaches that limit because 
parts of his or her invention may well turn out to be old or obvious.   
 As used here, the invention “is the particular means devised by 
the inventor by which [a] result is attained . . . .”54 In other words, the 
invention is the solution to a problem. The problem itself and the de-
                                                                                                                            
 50. Merges & Nelson, supra note 36, at 845. 
 51. Many look to the doctrine of equivalents for allowing patent scope to capture after-
arising technology. See supra note 39. 
 52. This point—separating the invention from the novelty and obviousness of that 
invention—needs to be emphasized, because by the middle of the twentieth century, patent 
law was using invention in two confusing ways that tended to blur the invention and pa-
tentable invention. See Liivak, supra note 9, at 45. Patent law referred both to the concrete 
solution created by the inventor as well as a descriptor indicating whether that solution 
was a significant advance over the prior art (what we today call nonobviousness). Id. That 
usage was unfortunate. As used here, the invention is just a neutral reference to the solu-
tion created by the inventor. 
 53. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 129-30 (3d ed. 1867) (“[T]he question  
in all cases is, first, what is the invention; and, secondly, is that invention a patentable  
subject . . . .”). 
 54. Electric R.R. Signal Co. v. Hall Ry. Signal Co., 114 U.S. 87, 96 (1885). 
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sired result, the object of the endeavor, is not the invention.55 Defin-
ing the invention as the solution to the problem is helpful, but that 
certainly does not fully define the invention. After all, the solution 
created by the inventor can be generalized at many levels of abstrac-
tion.56 At what level of generality can we identify the solution created 
by the inventor?57 Though some have given up hope for a doctrinal 
resolution, the following Parts show that patent law already has a 
well-developed notion of the invention, and as shown below, the cor-
rect level of abstraction is actually quite low, focusing on the embod-
iments disclosed in the patent.   
C. The Invention Is the Set of Disclosed Embodiments 
 As this Article argues for the notion that the invention is a set, 
this Part begins by establishing what constitutes elements of that 
set. And though it surely sounds pedantic, this Article argues that 
the invention is the set of things invented by the inventor. This Part 
first shows that inventing is the act of creating a specific, complete, 
and real solution to a technological problem. The Part then proceeds 
to show that the invention is simply the set of things invented and 
disclosed (i.e., the set of embodiments).58
 To that end, it is useful to consider what it means to invent. In 
patent jargon, inventors invent operable embodiments. The real, tan-
gible characteristic of invented things can be seen in the threshold 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.59 It establishes the things that can be 
considered by the patent system.60 It states that “[w]hoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.”61 In other words, inventors invent “process[es] 
machine[s], manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.”62 These are 
all real things, as opposed to metaphysical constructs or abstractions. 
These things are real in the sense that invented things are either 
                                                                                                                            
 55. See id.
 56. See Chiang, supra note 20, at 1099. 
 57. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 29, 51 (2005).
 58. But see Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: 
Looking to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Im-
provements, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1220 (2011) (arguing against using embodi-
ments as the primitives of claim scope). 
 59. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 60. See id.
 61. Id.
 62. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (“The applicant shall make oath that he be-
lieves himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent . . . .”). 
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physical objects (machines, manufactures, compositions of matter) or 
they are specific physical acts (processes and methods). 63
 Not only are these embodiments real, but they are complete and 
specific. Other references to inventing or inventors in patent law fo-
cus on the notion of conception.64 For inventorship, patent law deter-
mines who invented an invention based on conception, as 
“[c]onception is the touchstone of inventorship.”65 For priority deter-
minations, patent law determines when an inventor invents based on 
conception.66 Consistent with these cases, determining what was in-
vented should also begin by looking to the inventor’s conception. As 
noted in O’Reilly v. Morse, when the Court turned to “ascertain and 
settle, what is the thing which was invented,” the Court instructed 
“to this end it will be most convenient to begin at its conception.”67
 In particular, conception elaborates on the notion of the inventor’s 
specific means for solving some problem. “Conception is the ‘for-
mation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea 
of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be ap-
plied in practice.’ ”68 In accord with the discussion above, “[i]t is not 
sufficient that the result to be obtained be conceived, but it is re-
quired that there be conceived and disclosed the means provided to 
accomplish that result.”69
 Importantly, conception is complete when “[a]ll that remains to be 
accomplished in order to perfect the act or instrument belongs to the 
department of construction, not invention.”70 It is complete “when 
[the idea] has assumed such shape in the mind that it can be de-
scribed and illustrated; when the inventor is ready to instruct the 
mechanic in relation to putting it in working form.”71 A conception is 
complete and capable of being reduced to practice when an inventor 
is able to tell the ordinary mechanic both what is the specific, com-
plete invention as well as how to make and use that invention. 
                                                                                                                            
 63. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patentee Claims 7 (George Mason Univ. Law  
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-51), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130961 (articulating a view of embod-
iments as real but where the invention is an abstraction). 
 64. This section adapts in part the discussion from Liivak, supra note 9, at 20-21. 
 65. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed.  
Cir. 1994). 
66. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1943) (“It 
is well established that as between two inventors priority of invention will be awarded to 
the one who by satisfying proof can show that he first conceived of the invention.”). 
 67. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 68 (1854). 
 68. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(quoting 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 532 
(1890)); see Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 611 (C.C.P.A. 1950). 
 69. Field, 183 F.2d at 611 (emphasis omitted). 
 70. Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276, 1897 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 724, 731 
(D.C. Cir. 1897). 
 71. Cameron v. Brick, 1871 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 89, 90. 
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 In their casebook, John Duffy and Robert Merges emphasize that 
“conception” in patent law demands rigor:  
There must be a “definite” and “permanent” idea of the “complete” 
and “operative” invention. Conception does not occur until the in-
ventive idea is “crystallized in all of its essential attributes and be-
comes so clearly defined in the mind of the inventor as to be capa-
ble of being converted to reality and reduced to practice by the in-
ventor or by one skilled in the art.”72
 The result is that people invent real, completed embodiments that 
are ready to be usefully applied by “any” person of skill in the art.73
 Having shown that the things that are invented are real, specific, 
and complete embodiments, we can now ask what exactly is the in-
vention. In particular, how does the invention relate to the thing or 
things invented? Is the invention defined according to its plain mean-
ing as the set of things invented, or is the invention defined more 
broadly as something more abstract than the thing invented? 
 On this critical and not insubstantial question, foundational Su-
preme Court cases point in what appear to be opposing directions. 
The simplest and clearest definition of the invention is the set of 
things invented.74 Indeed, there is very strong support for this view. 
In numerous cases, the Court has emphasized that “[the patentee] 
can lawfully claim only what he has invented . . . .”75 An inventor can 
claim “the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to produce 
the result or effect he describes, and nothing more . . . . And any one 
may lawfully accomplish the same end without infringing the patent, 
if he uses means substantially different from those described.”76 All of 
these cases provide strong support for defining the invention as the 
set of disclosed embodiments and furthermore support limiting pa-
tent scope to that disclosed invention. 
 Yet an alternative line of cases appears to point in a different di-
rection. Those cases specifically reject protecting just the “mere form” 
of any one particular embodiment. Variations “merely in form or pro-
                                                                                                                            
 72. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 26 at 459 (quoting Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 74. But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 
(2006) (arguing for conceptualizing the invention as more than what was invented). 
 75. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1854); see also Ensten v. Simon, 
Ascher & Co., 282 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1931) (describing the “principle which forbids a pa-
tentee to assert a right to more than he has actually invented”) (quoting 2 ROBINSON, supra
note 68, at 284 (1890)); Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1869) (“No one is 
entitled to a patent for that which he did not invent . . . .”); O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 
120 (describing the “[t]he evil . . . if [a patentee] claims more than he has invented, alt-
hough no other person has invented it before him.”). 
 76. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119 (1854); see also Festo Corp. v. Sho-
ketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“What is claimed by the 
patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the specification . . . .”). 
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portions” that still are “substantially and essentially the same [as the 
patented thing] will be a violation of the patentee's right.”77 As stated 
by the Court, “[t]hough the mental concept is embodied or realized in 
a mechanism or a physical or chemical aggregate, the embodiment is 
not the invention and is not the subject of a patent.”78 Instead, “[a] 
patentable invention is a mental result. It must be new and shown to 
be of practical utility. Everything within the domain of the concep-
tion belongs to him who conceived it. The machine, process, or prod-
uct is but its material reflex and embodiment.”79
 In his oft-cited 1890 treatise, Robinson emphasized the proposi-
tion “that the subject-matter covered by a patent is the principle of 
the invention.”80 The “principle is the true subject-matter of the pa-
tented invention.”81 Even earlier, Curtis noted that “[l]earned judges 
have often laid it down that, where two things are the same in prin-
ciple, the one is an infringement upon the other” and “there is a sense 
in which the principle of an invention is undoubtedly to be consid-
ered, in determining whether an infringement has taken place.”82
 Justice Story emphasized this point when he described patent in-
fringement as “whether the machines used by the defendant are sub-
stantially, in their principles and mode of operation, like the plain-
tiff's machines. If so, it was an infringement of the plaintiff's patent 
to use them.”83 In the foundational case of Winans v. Denmead, the 
Supreme Court, referring to the principle of the invention as the 
“mode of operation,” emphasized that:  
[T]his new mode of operation is, in view of the patent law, the 
thing entitled to protection. The patentee may, and should, so 
frame his specification of claim as to cover this new mode of opera-
tion which he has invented; and the only question in this case is, 
whether he has done so; or whether he has restricted his claim to 
one particular geometrical form.84
And even later, in Continental Paper Bag, the Court again reiterated 
that patents protect the “principle” of the invention.85
 Initially, these cases focusing on the principle of the invention ap-
pear inconsistent with cases limiting patent scope to the disclosed 
                                                                                                                            
 77. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 372 (1837). 
 78. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933). 
 79. Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112, 118 (1875). 
 80. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 68, § 134, at 191. 
 81. Id. § 141, at 201. 
 82. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL IN-
VENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 219, at 321 (2d ed. 1854). 
 83. Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (Story,  
Circuit Justice). 
 84. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 341 (1854). 
 85. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1908); see also
Chiang, supra note 20, at 1098 (“[P]atents protect the ‘principle’ of the invention . . . .”). 
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embodiments. Rather than pointing to the concrete and clear objec-
tive evidence of the disclosed embodiments, these cases are directing 
patent law’s attention away from the mere “form” of any one embod-
iment to the more abstract notion of the principle of the invention. In 
fact, these cases have led some to argue that patent scope should ex-
tend beyond the disclosed embodiments and should capture some 
more abstract notion.86
 As will be shown below, I think that this misreads those cases. By 
referring to the principle of the invention, those cases were certainly 
trying to avoid restricting the inventor to any one particular embod-
iment, but they were not untethering the invention from the set of 
things invented and disclosed in the patent.87 In fact, most of the 
principle-of-the-invention cases are facially equivalent to the notion 
of the invention as the set of explicitly disclosed embodiments. And 
importantly, they should not be viewed as antithetical to the idea of 
the invention as the disclosed embodiments. Instead, they provide 
insight into the way a patentee can disclose embodiments that can 
reach into after-arising technology. The following Part explores this 
understanding of the principle of the invention.  
D. The Principle of the Invention Is the Set of Disclosed Embodiments 
 The previous Part highlighted two lines of Supreme Court cases. 
One line limits a patent’s exclusive rights to the embodiments in-
vented and disclosed in the patent itself. The other line looks beyond 
any one embodiment and links a patent’s scope to the more abstract 
principle of the invention. This Part explains how these two lines, 
which appear inconsistent, are in fact describing the same concept. 
 Before venturing further to explore the relationship between the 
principle and the invention, it is worthwhile to (again) be careful 
with even more patent terminology. First, the principle of the inven-
tion is not what might come to mind to the average reader. As it re-
lates to technology, most might assume that the principle of the in-
vention relates to the basic scientific principles that back some tech-
nological advance. Indeed “[i]n one sense, the word ‘principle’ denotes 
the physical force employed by an invention.”88 Patent law, though, 
has not used the principle to refer to these scientific principles. As 
emphasized by Justice Story, “the principles of a machine . . . [does] 
not mean[] the original elementary principles of motion, which phi-
                                                                                                                            
 86. See Chiang, supra note 38, at 1214-15. 
 87. The contrast between these two lines of Supreme Court cases mirrors a similar 
contrast between Federal Circuit cases that, on the one hand, refuse to import limitations 
to patent scope from any one embodiment, while on the other do restrict patent scope 
where the patent discloses nothing but that one embodiment.  
 88. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 68, § 135, at 193. 
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losophy and science have discovered . . . .”89 “No one . . . in the least 
acquainted with law, would for a moment contend, that a principle in 
this sense is the subject of a patent . . . .”90 And these prohibitions 
remain to this day in patent law’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
the statutory provision seen as the initial gatekeeper for statutory 
subject matter. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that despite 
generally broad patent eligibility, there remained three important 
exceptions to patentable subject matter, stating that “laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” continue to be excluded 
from patent eligibility.91
 Instead of referring to the underlying scientific principles, the 
principle of the invention (or as it has been alternatively referred to, 
the “mode of operation,”92 “modus operandi,”93 or the “idea of 
means”94) refers to the essential elements of the operative embodi-
ments. In defining the invention, these cases look beyond the “mere 
form” and its specifics. Robinson on Patents describes the principle of 
the invention as: 
[T]he spirit of the invention, that characteristic thought which is 
embodied in the operative means devised by the inventor. In refer-
ence to a machine, it is defined as its ‘modus operandi,’ its ‘struc-
ture and constituent parts;’ in reference to all inventions, as ‘the 
mode of applying powers to produce results,’ the ‘operative cause 
by which a certain result is produced,’ ‘the manner of producing  
the effect.’95
 The critical step is to understand the invention not as one particu-
lar embodiment, but rather as the set of embodiments disclosed in 
the patent. In other words, though a patent’s specification may well 
focus on one preferred embodiment, that one embodiment certainly is 
not usually the only embodiment disclosed. The principle of the in-
vention should be seen as the feature or features found in common in 
all of those disclosed embodiments. By understanding the invention 
                                                                                                                            
 89. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601) 
(Story, Circuit Justice); see also Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1853) 
(“It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a funda-
mental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in 
either of them an exclusive right.”). 
 90. CURTIS, supra note 82, § 219, at 321 n.1 (quoting Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 
923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047) (Story, Circuit Justice)). 
 91. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“[T]hese exceptions have defined 
the reach of [35 U.S.C. § 101] as a matter of stare decisis going back 150 years.” (citing Le
Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 174-75 (1853))). 
 92. This is distinct from the statutory command to “explain the principle and the sev-
eral modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle . . . .” Patent Act 
of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117. 
 93. Whittemore, , 29 F. Cas. at 1124. 
 94. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 68, § 139, at 199 (“All these phrases evidently refer to the 
idea of means.”). 
 95. Id. § 139, at 198. 
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as the set of disclosed embodiments, these two lines of cases can be 
reconciled. Limiting patent scope to the principle of the invention is in 
fact equivalent to limiting patent scope to the disclosed embodiments.  
 The connection between the two is that when the inventor can un-
derstand and disclose why one embodiment works to solve the prob-
lem at hand, the inventor often can also disclose alternative embodi-
ments. In other words, an inventor who understands the principles 
that underlie the success of one embodiment can often disclose a 
large set of related embodiments that will similarly work to solve the 
problem at hand. 
****************** 
 Already 150 years ago it was understood that this heady mix of 
the invention and the principle of the invention was challenging. 
Then, as now, “[p]erhaps the best method for the treatment of this 
subject will be to select some prominent and peculiar invention, as an
illustration of the question [of the principle of the invention] . . . .”96
This Article follows Curtis’s lead and now also explores some promi-
nent cases that help to illustrate these issues.  
 Importantly, the cases that follow show that two classes of cases 
were relevant under the aegis of the principle of the invention, and 
both are quite compatible with the notion of the invention as the set 
of disclosed embodiments. One mode of disclosure allowed the inven-
tor to simply list off explicit structurally defined alternative embodi-
ments. By showing which features of the embodiments could be re-
placed or substituted by other elements, the inventor disclosed a 
broad set of alternative embodiments and therefore a broad inven-
tion. Patent scope could then extend to any one of these explicitly dis-
closed embodiments. Other cases similarly allow a broad disclosure, 
but they do so not through explicit structural alternatives, but rather 
through what I call the generalized embodiment. As discussed below, 
it is this generalized embodiment that depends in part on functional-
ly disclosed elements and that type of disclosure enables the inven-
tion to reach after-arising technology. In either case, this ability to 
generalize and enumerate a large set of related alternative embodi-
ments was the hallmark of broad inventorship and is necessary for 
broad patent scope.  
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 1.  Disclosing Explicit Alternatives 
Tilghman v. Proctor provides an example of a patentee who dis-
closed a broad set of alternate embodiments.97 Richard Tilghman in-
vented a process for separating fatty acids and glycerine from fatty 
bodies by mixing the fatty bodies with water and then subjecting the 
mixture to a high temperature and high enough pressure to keep the 
liquid water in the mixture from converting to steam.98 In his  
patent application, he disclosed his best mode but yet in critical areas 
he further noted that his process would work with parameters differ-
ent from his disclosed best mode.99 In short, he disclosed variations 
on his best mode and each of these variations disclosed a multitude of  
alternate embodiments.  
 He described variations in vessels that could be employed,100 and 
he described variations in temperature that could be employed.101
The evidence in the case made it clear that Tilghman had indeed con-
ceived a very general process and had disclosed the specifics of his 
best mode along with all the numerous variations of his invented 
process. A broad claim in this case was sustained, as Tilghman had 
conceived a broadly applicable process and had disclosed the breadth 
of those embodiments in his specification.102
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. is another 
case that allows broad claims where alternate embodiments are dis-
closed.103 In allowing the broad claims, the Court stated that:  
We think it is clear that the court considered that [the inventor] 
sought to comply with [the disclosure requirements of the patent 
statute]. In other words, he filed a description of his invention, ex-
plained its principle and the best mode in which he ‘contemplated 
applying that principle,’ and did not intend to give up all other 
modes of application. An inventor must describe what he conceives 
to be the best mode, but he is not confined to that. If this were not 
so most patents would be of little worth. ‘The principle of the in-
vention is a unit, and invariable; the modes of its embodiment in 
the concrete invention may be numerous and in appearance very 
different from each other. . . . ’ Liddell was explicit in the declara-
tion that there might be alternatives for the device described and 
illustrated by him. He was explicit in saying that, in place of the 
device for controlling the movement of the forming plate relatively 
                                                                                                                            
 97. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881). 
 98. Id. at 712-13. 
 99. See id. at 730-33. 
 100. Id. at 730. 
 101. Id. at 732-33. 
 102. Id. at 726. 
 103. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 417-19 (1908). 
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to the cylinder that the plate might be moved or operated by any 
other suitable means.104
Both of these cases underscore one (relatively easy) way in which  
inventors are granted broader patent scope: disclosing explicit  
alternative embodiments. 
 It should be noted that these cases do not suggest that inventors 
who disclosed such alternatives can have broad patent scope in all 
possible facets of their invention. It is precisely those specific features 
of the embodiments for which alternatives are provided that receive 
broader protection. Where some feature does not or cannot have al-
ternative structures, patent scope will be quite narrow in that par-
ticular feature. This concept is further described below in discussing 
narrow inventorship and found inventions.  
 2.  Disclosing a Generalized Embodiment 
 In addition to disclosing specific alternative embodiments, broad 
inventorship and the principle of the invention cases allowed an in-
ventor to disclose broadly by disclosing the essential features of al-
ternative embodiments. In a sense, an abstracted, generalized em-
bodiment is disclosed. Rather than disclosing specific exemplars of 
alternative embodiments, the inventor provides more generalized in-
structions that, though general, can still direct a person of skill, 
without more, to make and use the conceived embodiment. As shown 
later, this variant becomes critical to allowing patent scope to extend 
to after-arising technology.  
 A good example of this type of disclosure is found in Neilson v. 
Harford.105 Though an English patent case, Neilson has been relied 
upon heavily and repeatedly by the Supreme Court in foundational 
cases like Tilghman v. Proctor,106 O’Reilly v. Morse,107 and even more 
recently in Parker v. Flook.108 Neilson invented a process for improv-
ing the performance of blast furnaces by preheating the air  
being pumped into the furnace.109 He achieved this by placing a re-
ceptacle between the bellows and the furnace itself.110 By externally 
heating the receptacle, the blast air was preheated before reaching 
the furnace.111 This raised the furnace temperature and made smelt-
ing more effective.112
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 As relayed in the case, Neilson described the embodiments that 
made up his invention in general terms.113 He generalized the embod-
iments that constituted his invention, but in an important respect he 
went beyond listing specific alternatives and instead defined the ex-
tent of the invention by arguing that certain properties were immate-
rial.114 In so doing, he relatively and directly outlined the contours of 
the invention.115 The court relays that: 
[I]n this specification, after stating that air heated up to red heat 
may be used, but that it is not necessary to go so far to produce a 
beneficial effect, he proceeds to state that the size of the receptacle 
will depend on the blast necessary for the furnace, and gives direc-
tions as to that; and then he adds, the shape of the receptacle is 
‘immaterial to the effect, and may be adapted to local circumstanc-
es. . . .’ To be valid, we think it should be such as, if fairly followed 
out by a competent workman, without invention or addition, would 
produce the machine for which the patent is taken out, and that 
such machine, so constructed, must be one beneficial to the public. 
. . . 
In the first sentence, the patentee, speaking of the temperature be-
ing so high as that of a red heat, adds, ‘that so high a temperature 
is not absolutely necessary to produce a beneficial effect;’ then he 
adds, that the receptacle may be made of iron, ‘but as the effect 
does not depend upon the nature of the material, other metals or 
convenient materials may be used.’ 116
In other words, Neilson provides directions that are rather broadly 
applicable. Importantly, despite that generality the instructions are 
not vague; they still must be detailed enough to be “followed out by a 
competent workman, without invention or addition.”117
 In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court focused on these aspects 
as critical to the broad patent scope afforded to Neilson. The Court  
noted that: 
[Neilson] pointed out the manner in which it might be done; but 
admitted that it might also be done in a variety of ways; and at a 
higher or lower temperature; and that all of them would produce 
the effect in a greater or less degree, provided the air was heated 
by passing through a heated receptacle. . . . And this effect was al-
ways produced, whatever might be the form of the receptacle, or 
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the mechanical contrivances for heating it, or for passing the cur-
rent of air through it, and into the furnace.118
 Neilson was able to generalize the shape and size of the recepta-
cles that would work, and though he did not explicitly disclose every 
size and shape, he did so in effect, by stating that the shape was  
immaterial. Similarly, he noted that the material to be used “may  
be made of iron” but “other metals or convenient materials may  
be used.”119
 In modern patent scholarship this concept of the generalized em-
bodiment has surfaced in recent discussions of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. For example, Craig Nard and Michael Meurer describe tech-
niques that allow claims to be drafted to cover after-arising technolo-
gy. That same idea is relied on here to show that an inventor, by fol-
lowing Neilson, can also disclose concrete embodiments that a future 
person of skill in the art can follow. Nard and Meurer relate that:  
Surprisingly, certain claim-drafting techniques allow inventors to 
claim technology that incorporates elements that have not been 
developed. Consider for example a patentable tennis racket that 
differs from previous rackets in terms of its shape and dimensions. 
The inventor must describe a suitable material for use in the rack-
et, but should avoid limiting herself to a particular material. In re-
cent years, rackets have become lighter and stronger, as manufac-
turers moved from wood to aluminum to graphite. An inventor, 
familiar with this trend, should describe the material used to 
make his racket in general terms, and then the patent claim will 
literally cover a racket of the same shape and dimension even if it 
is made from a substance that was not known at the time of the  
patent application.120
This technique described by Meurer and Nard is quite similar to the 
notion in Neilson in which the inventor disclosed that certain aspects 
of the embodiments were not material. In science and engineering 
the use of standards for technical instructions has been quite com-
mon for some time. Rather than always giving explicit instructions as 
to structure, engineers often are instead given functional instructions 
that they nonetheless are able to follow without more. Standard-
setting bodies such as the American Society for Testing Materials 
(ASTM) are designed specifically to allow such communication  
and functional quality assurance.121 For example, ASTM originated 
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from attempts to standardize the type and quality of steel used for  
constructing railroads.122
 In an early example of such a disclosure, the shape of the furnace 
in Neilson was immaterial123 and in the case of Meurer and Nard’s 
tennis racket it was the exact material from which the racket was 
constructed.124 Of course, it was not enough to just say that any ma-
terial could work, but rather an inventor would disclose what me-
chanical properties were necessary. These “conditions” are important 
and tied closely to an inventor’s understanding of the inner workings 
of an embodiment. Interestingly, some of the more helpful discus-
sions of the principle of the invention focus on exactly this type of 
generalization and its related conditions.   
 Justice Bushrod Washington, nephew of George Washington, de-
scribed the principle of the invention in the following way:  
What constitutes form, and what principle, is often a nice question 
to decide; and upon none, are the witnesses who are examined in 
patent causes, even those who are skilled in the particular art, 
more apt to disagree. It seems to me that the safest guide to accu-
racy in making the distinction is, first to ascertain what is the re-
sult to be obtained by the discovery; and whatever is essential to 
that object, independent of the mere form and proportions of the 
thing used for the purpose, may generally, if not universally, be 
considered as the principle of the invention.125
The focus is on the parts and features of the embodiments that 
are common to all of the disclosed embodiments (therefore essential 
insofar as that patent specification is concerned) to solving the prob-
lem in the way the inventor has envisioned. As put by Justice Story, 
“[t]he true legal meaning of the principle of a machine, with reference 
to the Patent Act, is, the peculiar structure or constituent parts of such 
machine.”126 Again, the principle of the invention follows the physical 
structures or parts that are shared by all the disclosed embodiments. 
Recently the Federal Circuit has used a similar formulation: 
[T]his court recognizes that it must interpret the claims in light of 
the specification, yet avoid impermissibly importing limitations 
from the specification. That balance turns on how the specification 
characterizes the claimed invention. In this respect, this court 
looks to whether the specification refers to a limitation only as a 
part of less than all possible embodiments or whether the specifi-
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cation read as a whole suggests that the very character of the in-
vention requires the limitation be a part of every embodiment.127
When an inventor understands why one embodiment works, he or 
she can then often conceive and reduce to practice other related em-
bodiments that will similarly work. When that is done, then indeed 
any one particular embodiment should not limit patent scope. Or, as 
put by Robinson, the invention should be something bigger than any 
one particular embodiment as “the modes of its embodiment in a con-
crete invention may be numerous and, in appearance, very different 
from each other.”128
E. The Disclosed Invention and the Disclosed Principle 
 Though it was somewhat inherent in the above discussion, it is 
worth emphasizing that even for the principle of the invention cases, 
the focus of the investigation did not extend beyond the objective evi-
dence disclosed in the patent itself. For example, even understanding 
that the principle of the invention refers to the essential structural 
components of the embodiments requires determining the structural 
features that are common to all of the disclosed embodiments. This  
is important because otherwise these principle of the invention cases 
could be misinterpreted to disconnect patent scope from the disclo-
sure. For example, some might mistakenly think that the principle 
can be developed ex post after the patent is filed (perhaps as part  
of litigation). 
As shown below, the Court clearly defined the principle of the in-
vention as the disclosed principle in the specification itself. It was not 
developed ex post during litigation by theorizing how the invention 
works. This is an important feature of the concept of the invention 
that limits the invention to the objective disclosed patent and reduces 
the ability for later gamesmanship during litigation.  
 In Winans v. Denmead, the Supreme Court stated that the “mode 
of operation” (a synonym for the principle of the invention) can be 
found by studying “what appears on the face of the specification”129
and the infringement determination focuses on whether the defend-
ant uses “the same mode of operation as that described by the pa-
tentee.”130 In other words, we need not search far for the principle of 
the invention—it must be disclosed in the patent itself. The Court 
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stated that patent scope “cover[s] the described mode of operation by 
which the result is attained.”131 As summed up by one of the most in-
fluential treatises of the nineteenth century, infringement:  
[I]nvolves substantial identity, whether that identity is described 
by the terms, “same principle,” same modus operandi, or any oth-
er. It is a copy of the thing described in the specification of the pa-
tentee, either without variation, or with only such variations as 
are consistent with its being, in substance, the same thing.132
 That these Supreme Court cases and treatises were referring to 
the disclosed principle should come as no surprise. From 1793 until 
1952, the statutory disclosure requirement had an extra requirement 
explicitly for patents claiming machines. The patent specification was 
required to “fully explain the principle and the several modes in 
which he has contemplated the application of the principle. . . .”133
This understanding is not only supported by these historic cases, but 
it also ensures that any embodiments that are covered by the patent 
are in fact embodiments conceived and reduced to practice by the in-
ventor. It ensures that patent scope extends only to “what they them-
selves have created.”134   
F. Keeping the Invention Rooted to Embodiments 
As the above discussion makes clear, patent law allows patent 
scope to extend beyond any one particular embodiment in some cases. 
The danger is that this process of abstraction could become unwieldy 
and lead to patents with wholly unpredictable scopes. In other words, 
if patent law allowed its reach to go beyond the embodiments dis-
closed, then some rightfully worry that “there is no obvious princi-
pled limit to this abstraction process.”135
 Yet as suggested above, broad inventorship and its broad patent 
scope will not necessarily lead to vague boundaries. The key is that 
the abstraction process is still strongly tethered not to one embodi-
ment but instead to the well-defined set of all disclosed embodiments. 
This subtle point was made in an early and influential English pa-
tent case. In Boulton v. Bull the court recognized that “it is necessary 
to inquire, what is meant by a principle reduced to practice. It can 
only mean a practice founded on principle, and that practice is the 
thing done or made. . . .”136 In other words the principle, though in a 
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sense abstract, must still be tied to the disclosed embodiments that 
have been reduced to practice. 
Along similar lines, Justice Story made clear that, though there is 
a focus on the principle of the invention, this principle never strays far 
from actual machines or processes. In Blanchard v. Sprague, a circuit 
court case cited later in O’Reilly v. Morse, Justice Story explained: 
Looking at the present specification, and construing all its terms 
together, I am clearly of opinion, that it is not a patent claimed for 
a function, but it is claimed for the machine specially described in 
the specification; that is, not for a mere function, but for a function 
as embodied in a particular machine, whose mode of operation and 
general structure are pointed out. . . . This seems to me sufficiently 
expressive to define and ascertain what his invention is. It is a par-
ticular machine, constituted in the way pointed out, for the accom-
plishment of a particular end or object. The patent is for a machine, 
and not for a principle or function detached from machinery.137
Robinson summed these ideas and stated that:  
The principle or essence of an invention, however, when taken by 
itself, is no more patentable than the principle or force which it 
proposes to employ. Like that, it is but an abstraction, resting in 
theory alone, and not an operative means. Until reduced to prac-
tice it is not a complete invention, nor does it stand on any higher 
ground of legal merit than the discovery of an existing natural 
power. It must become ‘a principle, put in practice and applied,’ a 
‘practice founded on principle,’ before it passes from the shadowy 
regions of mere intellectual apprehension into the domain of the  
industrial arts.138
Curtis, in his influential treatise, specifically acknowledged the pit-
falls of allowing patent scope to extend to the principle of the invention, 
and he similarly felt patent law could avoid these problems so long as it 
tethered the principle to operable embodiments. He advised that: 
The danger of claiming an abstract principle will be avoided by the 
use of appropriate terms, signifying that the application of the 
principle is claimed as effected by the means used and described 
by the patentee, and by all other means which, when applied with-
in the just scope of his conditions, will perform, for the purpose of 
the application, the like office.139
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In sum, though it enables patent scope to extend beyond any one em-
bodiment, the invention is limited to the disclosed embodiments 
whether those embodiments are disclosed structurally or functionally.    
III. NARROW INVENTORSHIP: UNABLE TO GENERALIZE ELEMENTS
 Though the previous Part spent considerable time exploring when 
and how a patentee can attain broad patent scope, those opportuni-
ties are not available in every case. As suggested in the discussion of 
35 U.S.C. § 101, to be patent eligible, the patentee must have invent-
ed something.140 In other words a patentee must have invented at 
least one embodiment. And having just one embodiment does not en-
title the patentee to anything more than that one embodiment. As 
detailed above, broad inventorship entails disclosing alternative em-
bodiments. But not every inventor is able to generalize to disclose 
alternatives. When the inventor does not generalize and does not 
provide alternatives, the set of disclosed embodiments is small and 
patent scope is correspondingly narrow.   
 Narrow inventorship happens in two ways. First, an inventor 
might invent broadly yet (perhaps from poor advice from the prose-
cuting patent attorney) disclose just one embodiment. Since the in-
ventor provided no proof of a broader invention, patent law still 
treats these inventions as acts of narrow inventorship. Second, and 
more interesting, are the cases where the inventor just cannot invent 
broadly. In many important areas, inventors are forced to rely on 
serendipity or trial-and-error searching to find operable embodi-
ments. In those cases the inventor likely may not understand why 
the one particular embodiment works. As a result, the inventor can-
not disclose alternative embodiments, and the set of disclosed embod-
iments is very small, often limited to just the one embodiment.  
 This Part explores this topic of narrow inventorship and shows 
that patent law has long dealt with this issue especially for inven-
tions that are developed through trial and error. These historical ex-
amples have occurred in numerous areas of technology. This Part will 
explore two early examples relating to plow shape and to light bulb 
filaments. The Part then proceeds to modern examples of low inven-
torship. In particular, the Part shows that aspects of inventions in 
biotechnology fit this mold. 
 This Part shows that the screening techniques common in modern 
biotechnology are quite useful in finding embodiments that can solve 
some highly relevant and important biotechnological problems. But 
because the screening techniques are essentially trial-and-error 
techniques, inventors are unable to disclose related embodiments. 
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Often, they just know that their one embodiment works but cannot 
generalize a broader genus of embodiments that will also work. Ac-
cordingly, many patents in this area are afforded rather narrow 
claim scope. This is not the result of extra stringent disclosure re-
quirements that are directed only at the biotechnology industry. Ra-
ther, these narrow patents result from narrow inventions.  
A. Historic Recognition of Narrow Inventorship 
 In Winans v. Denmead, one of the foundational cases establishing 
notions of broad inventorship, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
“there may be cases in which the letters-patent do include only the 
particular form described” and patent scope will be limited to that 
one disclosed embodiment.141 In other words, the broad inventorship 
described above is not available in all cases. The Court in Winans
went on to explain that such a narrow definition is in entire accord-
ance with what is above stated [about broad inventions]: 
     The reason why such a patent covers only one geometrical 
form, is not that the patentee has described and claimed that form 
only; it is because that form only is capable of embodying his in-
vention; and, consequently, if the form is not copied, the invention 
is not used.  
     Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look 
at the form only. Where they are separable; where the whole sub-
stance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is the 
duty of courts and juries to look through the form for the substance of 
the invention—for that which entitled the inventor to his patent, and 
which the patent was designed to secure; where that is found, there 
is an infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is embodied in a 
form not described, and in terms claimed by the patentee.142
In supporting its contention that some inventions are in fact narrow 
and limited in scope, the Court in Winans pointed to Davis v. Palmer,
describing it as “seem[ing] to have been one of those [narrow] cas-
es.”143 Davis was a very early circuit court decision written by Chief 
Justice Marshall riding circuit in Virginia.144
 The patent at issue in Davis related to an improved shape for the 
mould boards of plows. In the patent, the inventor described the 
problem of existing plow shapes, finding that:  
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[I]n raising and turning over the furrow-slice, it always either ac-
quires a convex form on the under side, or else it is broken off into 
pieces, and thrown over; as might therefore be anticipated, it will 
be found that all these mould-boards [built using prior art straight 
line designs] wear through in the operation of ploughing about 
midway, while the upper and lower edges are scarcely rubbed. It 
also necessarily results, that ploughs of this construction work 
hard, and are of heavy draught. . . .145
 From this observation, the inventor in Davis then recognized the 
general problem afflicting the current plow designs: “because the 
mould-board, not being adapted to the convex form which the furrow-
slice is disposed to assume, lifts the furrow-slice at a single point, and 
that in the middle,” and the inventor then arrived at a better plow 
design that would lift the furrow-slice “equally . . . throughout the  
entire operation.”146
 The inventor then moves to describe his specific plow design: 
In order to meet and remedy the inconveniences arising from this 
form of structure, I form my mould-board into a different shape; 
and instead of working the moulding part, or face of the mould-
board to straight lines, my improvement is to work it to circular or 
spheric lines. By repeated experiments, I have ascertained, that 
. . . the circle or segment [sic] to which the mould-board is wrought, 
should have about three times the radius of the smaller segments 
. . . the former being about thirty-six inches, the latter twelve. . . . 
[The resulting shape of the plow] uniformly forms a section of a 
loxodromic, or spiral curve, and when applied to practice, is found 
to fit or embrace every part of the furrow-slice, far more than any 
other shaped plough.147
The central issue in the case, one which should ring familiar to any 
modern patent lawyer, is whether the patent should be limited to the 
particular plow design that was explicitly disclosed, or whether it 
could extend to something broader. Chief Justice Marshall relayed 
that “[t]he counsel for the plaintiff seem disposed to consider . . . the 
subsequent more particular description, as merely an illustration of 
the general principle, as one mode of carrying it into execution.”148 But 
looking to the patent specification the Chief Justice concluded “we do 
not think the specification will admit of this [broad] construction.”149
Davis represents a case where the inventor clearly made some in-
roads toward a generalized solution. He understood that improving 
plow design required a plow whose shape would turn over the furrow 
slice, not at one particular point, but “equally . . . throughout the en-
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tire operation.”150 But that observation, though perhaps important for 
moving toward a solution, did not itself solve the problem. It was, in 
an important sense, just the basis for a “research plan.”151 As admit-
ted by the inventor, to reach the actual design that could actually 
solve the problem at hand required “repeated experiments.”152 And 
the inventor, because of that experimentation, could not disclose a 
vast array of alternatives. Without those alternatives, the invention 
was narrow and the patent’s exclusive rights accordingly did not ex-
tend much past a plow design, according to the embodiment detailed 
in the figures.  
 A very similar line of reasoning resolved the 1887 case of Snow v. 
Lake Shore & M.S. Railway. The patent at issue involved improvements 
for steam-driven bells on railroad engines. In that case, the Court de-
scribed the invention and affirmed the finding of noninfringement: 
It is not admissible to adopt the argument made on behalf of 
the appellants, that [the specifics of the preferred embodi-
ment] is to be taken as a mere recommendation by the pa-
tentee of the manner in which he prefers to arrange these 
parts of his machine. There is nothing in the context to indi-
cate that the patentee contemplated any alternative for the 
arrangement of the piston and piston-rod. The arrangement 
of the valves, as shown in the drawings, he declared not to 
be essential, and explained how they might be otherwise ad-
justed, and the comparative advantage and disadvantage of 
those plans; but no such language is used in reference to the 
connection between the piston and its rod.153
In their patent specification, the inventors had invented rather 
broadly along one dimension. They had explicitly disclosed that the 
arrangement of the valves could be varied, and in this sense the in-
vention tended toward high inventorship, but the inventors made no 
broadening disclosure with respect to the piston and piston-rod.154
Without disclosing any alternatives along that dimension, the inven-
tion was construed quite narrowly in that respect, deviating little from 
the specific piston arrangement exemplified in the patent figures.155
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 Perhaps the best-known example of narrow inventorship is the 
1885 Supreme Court case concerning the The Incandescent Lamp Pa-
tent.156 The case focused on inventors who could not generalize be-
yond their limited operable embodiments. In particular, the inventors 
employed trial-and-error screening that is, in principle, no different 
than techniques employed today in biotechnology.157 Furthermore, 
the case also made clear that narrow inventorship need not prevent 
broad patent scope if that initially narrow invention is broadened be-
fore filing the patent. 158 The Court noted that, having found an oper-
able embodiment, an inventor could earn a broader patent if, by un-
derstanding that one embodiment, the inventor could then generalize 
and provide alternatives.159
 In the search for useful incandescent light bulb filaments, pro-
gress had been made as to the suitable shapes, electrical resistances, 
and even general construction of the filaments.160 But researchers 
were still hunting to find the best materials from which to construct 
the filaments.161 In their patent, the plaintiffs Sawyer and Mann dis-
closed that they had reduced to practice filaments made from both 
carbonized paper and wood carbon.162 They confined their third claim 
to these embodiments, claiming filaments “formed of carbonized pa-
per, substantially as described.”163 Their first claim, though, was 
much broader, covering a filament constructed from any “carbonized 
fibrous or textile material.”164 Commenting on these two claims, the 
Supreme Court noted that “[i]nstead of confining [their claims] to 
carbonized paper, as they might properly have done, and in fact did 
in their third claim, they made a broad claim for [filaments made 
from] every fibrous or textile material.”165 The Court asked if the pa-
tentees were “entitled” to such a broad “monopoly,” to which the 
Court answered “[w]e think not,” and affirmed the invalidity of the  
asserted claims.166   
 Importantly, the case does not stand for the proposition that pa-
tentees can only rightfully claim the embodiments that they actually
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reduce to practice. The Court made it clear that Sawyer and Mann, 
even with only the two embodiments that were actually reduced to 
practice, could have invented and disclosed more broadly. The Court 
stated, “[i]f the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile sub-
stances a quality common to them all, or to them generally, as distin-
guishing them from other materials, such as minerals, etc., and such 
quality or characteristic adapted them peculiarly to incandescent 
conductors, such claim might not be too broad.”167  In other words, if 
their knowledge of these materials allowed them to conceive of the 
other particular fibrous and textile materials that were suitable as 
filaments, then such a broad claim “would, perhaps, not [have been] 
extravagant.”168 As discussed above in relation to high inventorship, 
where an inventor has broadly conceived of solutions to his or her 
relevant problem and then disclosed that broad conception, patent 
law, insofar as 35 USC § 112 ¶ 1 is concerned, allows the invention 
and patent scope to track that broad conception. 
 But where a patentee has not disclosed anything beyond the em-
bodiments that have been actually reduced to practice, patent law 
has no choice but to limit the claims to those embodiments. As stated 
by the Supreme Court:  
Under these circumstances, to hold that one who had discovered 
that a certain fibrous or textile material answered the required 
purpose should obtain the right to exclude everybody from the 
whole domain of fibrous and textile materials, and thereby shut 
out any further efforts to discover a better specimen of that class 
than the patentee had employed, would be an unwarranted exten-
sion of his monopoly, and operate rather to discourage than to  
promote invention.169
Just as for high inventorship, patent scope extends only as far as the 
disclosed invention. When no more than one or a few embodiments 
are disclosed, patent scope does not extend any further as well. 
B. Modern Examples of Narrow Inventorship 
 In accord with The Incandescent Lamp Patent case, modern patent 
law also allows patent claims broader than the preferred embodi-
ments when the specification evidences a conception and invention 
broader than those embodiments. For example, in Enzo Biochem, Inc. 
v. Gen-Probe Inc., the Federal Circuit recognized that the deposit of a 
nucleotide sequence could provide written description support for 
that sequence.170 Yet the Court did not announce a brightline rule 
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that claims were necessarily limited to that deposited embodiment. 
In theory, a patentee could claim more broadly than the one embodi-
ment that was actually reduced to practice and deposited. The Court, 
citing to the PTO’s Written Description Guidelines, held that a pa-
tentee could claim more broadly “by disclosure of sufficiently detailed, 
relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e., complete or partial struc-
ture, other physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteris-
tics when coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between func-
tion and structure, or some combination of such characteristics.”171
 In other words, the description of an actual embodiment that has 
been reduced to practice can be part of the support for a broader ge-
nus claim when the specification also discloses additional infor-
mation, like some “correlation between function and structure” of the 
genus,172 or as put by the Supreme Court, some “quality common to” 
the genus.173 This simply echoes the discussion of high inventorship 
above. To claim broadly, the inventor must both invent and disclose 
broadly. The PTO Guidelines cited in Enzo state that “[t]he ‘essential 
goal’ of the description of the invention requirement is to clearly con-
vey the information that an applicant has invented the subject mat-
ter which is claimed.”174 As emphasized by Judge Newman’s concur-
rence in Enzo, the disclosure requirements of § 112 “sets forth what 
has been invented, and sets boundaries of what can be claimed.”175
C.   Patent Scope for Monoclonal Antibodies  
 One unresolved area where the issue of narrow inventorship 
should play, but has not yet played, a decisive role is the patenting of 
monoclonal antibodies.176 It is one of the most important areas for 
new drug discoveries and advances.177 The revenues associated with 
these new drugs are truly staggering, often reaching into the billions 
per year.178 Antibody patents are also notable because they benefit 
from what has come to be known as the “antibody exception.”  
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 The PTO’s Written Description Guidelines describe one example 
in which the disclosure of one monoclonal antibody (i.e. one embodi-
ment), along with structural information about the antigen, can pro-
vide support for any antibody that binds to that antigen.179 Cases like 
Noelle v. Lederman have favorably cited these guidelines, though 
they have not relied upon them for their holdings.180 The trouble is 
that those PTO guidelines are in tension, if not in complete conflict, 
with the basic notions of the invention outlined here.181
 Disclosure of a well-characterized antigen alone would not provide 
support for any antibody that binds to that antigen. And disclosure of 
one actual antibody provides § 112 support only for that antibody—
not the entire genus of antibodies that binds to the antigen. The 
problem is, as put by Eli Lilly and Company in their amicus brief in 
Centocor v. Abbott, “[e]ven with today’s most advanced scientific 
tools, it is impossible to predict the actual structure . . . of a not-yet-
known antibody based on the structure of an antigen or even the 
structure of another antibody that binds that same antigen.”182 Given 
the three-dimensional structure of an antigen, we cannot today con-
ceive (without actually going into the lab and making one) an anti-
body that will bind to that antigen.183 Furthermore, even once we 
make one antibody that does bind to an antigen, that alone does not 
allow for the conception of any other antibodies (much less every an-
tibody) that will also bind to that antigen.184
 As the Federal Circuit determined, Centocor’s “application only 
provides amino acid sequence information . . . for a single mouse var-
iable region.”185 It was the one variable region deposited. Yet claims 
two and three covered all variable regions that bind and neutralize 
TNF? in a similar location as the deposited antibody.186 There is 
nothing in the specification that evidences conception of any other 
variable regions beyond the one deposited variable region.187 That 
disparity between the solutions disclosed versus the solutions 
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claimed makes the issue of antibody patenting the modern version of 
the overreaching patentees in The Incandescent Lamp Patent case.188
 Yet Centocor did not explicitly overrule the antibody exception. We 
still do not have clear guidance that even this immensely important 
field must abide by the rules set for the rest of patent law—patent 
scope cannot extend beyond the disclosed invention. If a solution to a 
technical problem is found through trial and error (even sophisticat-
ed, elegant trial and error such as for antibodies) without further dis-
covering how to extrapolate to other solutions, claims cannot exceed 
that one particular solution.189 Currently antibody patents have scope 
that far exceeds the inventions disclosed in their patents. It is an ar-
ea where these arguments about narrow inventorship should have an  
important impact.  
IV. THE INVENTION AND AFTER-ARISING TECHNOLOGY
 This Part applies this spectrum of high and low inventorship to 
explain the reach of patent scope into after-arising technology. It is 
an area that is still controversial and unsettled in the courts and in 
patent scholarship. As explained by Robin Feldman:  
[C]ases concerning how far a biotechnology inventor can reach to-
ward future inventions stand in contradiction to each other. Some 
opinions conclude broadly that the definition of an invention in-
cludes all embodiments, even those that could not have existed at 
the time of the invention. Other opinions use claim construction 
doctrines to limit a patent holder's reach only to embodiments 
known at the time of the invention. Still others use a different set 
of doctrines to conclude that a patent holder's reach sometimes
includes things that were unknown at the time of the invention, 
but not always. These opinions, pulling in different directions, 
make it difficult to predict how far an inventor can reach toward  
later inventions.190
Nonetheless, though the doctrine is confusing, there is a strong sense 
among many that “patent claims . . . should grow over time to en-
compass improvements”191 even, and perhaps especially, improve-
ments that use after-arising technology in at least some cases. If pa-
tents are to reach such technology, then many find it impossible to 
limit patent scope “to the set of things that a patentee makes availa-
ble to the public” in their patent specification.192 This particular area 
demonstrates in a particularly metaphysical way the difficult tension 
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between clear, predictable notice of patent boundaries and adequate 
scope of those boundaries. 
 Though there is some debate about this issue,193 most agree that 
patents should cover after-arising technology to some degree. After 
all, if they cannot, then many worry that most patents would quickly 
become worthless, as copyists could ride the coattails of an initial pa-
tent while evading its exclusive reach due to some technological change 
that had been unavailable at the time the initial patent was filed.194
For example, consider the famous Wright Flyer invented and pa-
tented by the Wright brothers. It was an airplane built with a mostly 
wooden frame with canvas stretched over it. Suppose that, after filing 
their patent, a competitor learns that material science has advanced 
and that a new covering material (that could not have been explicitly 
disclosed by the Wright brothers) has been invented and is available. 
The competitor buys the new material and, following the Wright pa-
tent, builds the Wright Flyer with this new, after-arising covering ra-
ther than the older canvas disclosed and used by the Wrights. Should 
the Wright brothers patent extend to this new airplane or not?195
Many would agree that the Wright patent should extend to the 
after-arising variant, and indeed as a descriptive matter, patents 
have always covered after-arising technology to some degree. Yet 
once that door is opened (as I think it should and must), patent law is 
confronted with a number of challenges. Patent law must answer 
when and to what extent such extensions into after-arising technology 
should be made. Patent law must create a coherent, consistent frame-
work by which inventors, patent attorneys, and judges can understand 
the proper limits of patents for this critically important area. 
Developing this needed framework is challenging. First, it is chal-
lenging (perhaps inherently so) because of the nature of after-arising 
technology. As argued above, patent law is based on the idea that the 
patent rights extend only to that which the inventor both invented 
and disclosed. Yet how could an inventor disclose some technology 
that by definition arises after the patent has been filed?196 How could 
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the Wright brothers invent and disclose an airplane covered by a new 
fabric that did not even exist when they wrote their patent? As dis-
cussed next, all current attempts to create a coherent and consistent 
treatment of after-arising technology are forced to confront this issue, 
and the ensuing contortions required have been unsatisfying in one 
way or another. Second, it is challenging because the actual cases 
dealing with after-arising technology are not all uniform. Some cases 
allow the patent to cover after-arising technology while others do not. 
A coherent theory of after-arising technology needs to explain the 
outcomes of these cases. 
A. Attempts at a Coherent Framework 
 Patent scholarship has tried to address these cases and the whole 
topic of after-arising technology. Rob Merges put forth one of the ear-
liest explanations. He aimed to resolve this confusion, which he 
termed the temporal paradox, by showing that the timing of the dis-
closure requirement and infringement standard differed.197 Merges 
noted that enablement was judged at the time of filing, while in-
fringement was judged later at the time of infringement.198 According 
to Merges’s view, the Wright brothers could disclose their airplane 
with their canvas covering and they could claim an airplane with a 
covering. Such a claim would satisfy the enablement requirement as 
they have enabled a person of skill to make an airplane covering as 
that term was understood at the time of filing. At some later date, 
when a competitor makes the airplane variant with the after-arising 
covering, that claim would still be valid, but would—for infringement 
purposes—be construed as the term was understood at the time of 
infringement. As the new material would now qualify as a covering, 
the new airplane variant would infringe the Wright brothers’ patent. 
Because of this temporal disparity, a valid claim is able to cover em-
bodiments that were not explicitly disclosed in the patent application. 
As a descriptive matter, some cases do fit this mold. As described 
in more detail below, the court in Laser Alignment v. Woodruff al-
lowed the scope of “a collimated beam of light” to expand to include a 
laser despite the fact that lasers had not been invented until after the 
patent at issue had been filed.199 Yet other cases do not fit this mold. 
In Schering v. Amgen, the court limited the meaning of a claim term 
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to the meaning at the time of filing.200 The term was not allowed to 
expand to capture after-arising technology.201
In addition to this descriptive incompleteness, there are other 
problems with the temporal disparity explanation. First, the exist-
ence of the temporal disparity requires construing patent claims dif-
ferently at different times. As argued by Mark Lemley, this incon-
sistency, though allowing for patents that cover after-arising technolo-
gy, breaks a cardinal rule of fairness in patent law: claims are inter-
preted alike for both validity and infringement purposes.202 A patentee 
should not be able to argue that claims mean one narrow thing to get 
them past the validity requirements, while then arguing that the 
claims mean something much broader in order to catch infringers.203
Second, though the theory explains some of the cases, its mecha-
nism of reaching after-arising technology appears somewhat arbi-
trary in that it depends a great deal on the growth in scope of claim 
terms alone (which are almost always drafted by an attorney), rather 
than any fact derived from the underlying invention. For example, 
had the Wright brothers hypothetically claimed their airplane as 
“covered by cotton canvas” rather than the more generic “having a 
covering,” they would likely have been out of luck. The term “cover-
ing” could fortuitously grow over time while the term “cotton canvas 
covering” likely could not grow as much. This puts undue emphasis 
on the particular claim terms used as opposed to the invention dis-
closed in the patent.  
In light of these problems, Mark Lemley argued that claim terms 
should be construed at one fixed point in time, and he argued that 
the time of filing should be used.204 For him, this limitation provides 
better public notice, but it prevents the temporal disparity from 
providing literal claim scope for after-arising technology.205 He adds 
that “[t]his does not mean, however, that the patents themselves 
cannot cover later-developed technologies. Patentees can use the doc-
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trine of equivalents to reach such technologies.”206 Indeed, he argues 
that the modern doctrine of equivalents despite its many limitations 
can (and is especially designed to fill that role. Others have similarly 
argued for using the doctrine of equivalents in reaching after-arising 
technology.207 But the reliance on the doctrine of equivalents cannot 
be a fully satisfactory answer. As it is currently understood it is no-
toriously hard to predict and administer. As a result, pushing off 
these hard questions into the doctrine of equivalents simply hides 
the underlying lack of predictability. If the doctrine were more  
predictable, then perhaps it could become a reliable tool for reaching  
after-arising technology.
Apart from the doctrine of equivalents, recently Kevin Collins 
proposed an innovative alternative mechanism that in many ways 
combines both of these approaches.208 He focused on a mechanism by 
which literal claim scope can expand to capture after-arising technol-
ogy during claim construction while claim interpretation would re-
main firmly fixed at the time of filing.209 The key to his proposal is 
that claim language can be viewed as describing a set definition, and 
the words that define the set are interpreted as of the time of filing. 
Yet the members of that set (meaning embodiments that qualify for 
membership) can grow over time.210 Collins shows how these linguis-
tic tools can allow interpretation to occur as of the time of filing while 
the claims can be construed at the time of infringement.211
Collins’s approach is interesting because it meshes nicely with 
the above discussion of broad inventorship and generalized embodi-
ments. By disclosing essential conditions that need to be satisfied, for 
example by stating that the material is immaterial, the inventor can 
disclose embodiments that cannot yet be built. In other words, 
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though those after-arising embodiments cannot be built yet, the in-
structions for their construction are already waiting in the patent 
disclosure for use later by future persons of skill. They form what I 
call a trans-technological disclosure or a functional disclosure.212      
The reach of a patent into after-arising technology is simply a re-
lation to its high or low inventorship. In cases of high inventorship, 
where some feature of the disclosed embodiments is highly general-
ized, after-arising technology can embody the invention. In contrast, 
for low inventorship the invention does not extend beyond the specific 
embodiments already described. In those cases, patent scope should 
not extend into after-arising technology.  
Two cases, Schering v. Amgen213 and Laser Alignment v. Wood-
ruff,214 have often been used to explore patent scope as it relates to 
after-arising technology. In Schering, the courts refused to interpret 
the claim term IFN-? broadly, thus preventing the claim and the pa-
tent from encompassing after-arising variants of the IFN-? protein.215
In contrast, in Laser Alignment, the court interpreted the claim term 
“collimated beam of light” broadly, allowing the claim and the patent 
to encompass the use of lasers even though lasers were not invented 
until after the patent had been filed.216
 These seemingly contradictory cases can be reconciled when 
viewed from the perspective of the disclosed invention. In short, the 
inventor in Schering disclosed a narrow invention that did not extend 
beyond the one explicitly disclosed variant of IFN-?.217 In contrast, 
the inventor in Laser Alignment disclosed a more generalized method 
where the exact source of the collimated beam of light (whether a fo-
cused beam from a traditional lamp or a laser) was not material.218
One case was a narrow invention with no reach into after-arising 
technology, while the other was broader allowing some reach into af-
ter-arising technology along the dimension of the light source. 
 In Schering, the patent at issue related to “recombinant DNA 
molecules encoding specific types of human interferon.”219 In particu-
lar, the patent as a whole and the claims referred to “DNA sequences 
which code on expression for a polypeptide of the IFN-? type [of inter-
feron].”220 Interferon, we now know, is a class of proteins that play an 
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important role in our bodies’ own antiviral defenses.221 At the time 
the inventor in Schering filed his patent, much of this was not yet 
known. But soon, “[t]he scientific meaning of ‘IFN-?’ evolved with 
new discoveries. Specifically, the scientific community learned that 
leukocytes produce more than a single interferon polypeptide.”222
 One of the main issues in the case then became whether the claim 
term IFN-? should be interpreted narrowly to include only the pro-
tein explicitly disclosed by the inventor, or whether it should be in-
terpreted broadly according to its more modern meaning. The correct 
answer is to first understand the disclosed invention, determining 
whether it is narrow or broad, and then to attempt to interpret the 
claim term as consistently as possible with the disclosed invention.223
In this case, the patent itself made clear that the successful embodi-
ment was one that was found by a trial-and-error screening pro-
cess.224 And without any significant ability to generalize other solu-
tions, the court concluded that “[e]ven a cursory review of the claims 
reveals that they recite the specific recombinant DNA inserts isolated 
by Dr. Weissmann, and their use.”225 Ultimately, the court “inter-
pret[ed] the claim term ‘IFN-?’ in light of the patent’s written de-
scription. The written description clarifies that Dr. Weissmann made 
no attempt to broaden his invention to cover polypeptides not discov-
ered at the time of his patent application.”226 The court looked to the 
patent and found a narrow invention without any alternatives dis-
closed, and the claims were rightfully interpreted narrowly. The 
court concluded that “[t]o grant broader coverage would reward Dr. 
Weissmann for inventions he did not make.”227
 In contrast in Laser Alignment, the court interpreted a claim term 
broadly allowing it to encompass after-arising technology.228 As re-
layed by the court, the patent disclosed “a method and means for lay-
ing [a] pipeline on a selected grade line by resort to establishing a 
light beam line of reference.”229 The patent described a method by 
which a “collimated beam of light” is used as a reference line that al-
lows pipe to be laid along a prescribed gradient.230 The patent itself  
disclosed that:  
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The projector is provided with the well-known pin hole aperture 
and condensing lens (not shown) for projecting a beam of light hav-
ing parallel rays. The beam of light is pencil-like in diameter and 
the light source is of a high candlepower adequate to project the 
beam a distance of up to 400 feet.231
And in describing the patented method, the claims require the step of 
“projecting a collimated narrow beam of light from said source posi-
tion along the selected axis.”232
 The defendant was using a near-identical method, but used a laser 
rather than the lamp and lens explicitly disclosed in the patent. The 
district court held that the “defendants had not infringed” because 
“[t]he use of a beam generated by a laser in a method of laying sewer 
pipe cannot infringe a claim directed to use of a collimated beam of 
light contained in a patent whose application was filed before the in-
vention of the laser.”233 The appellate court reversed, holding that:  
A fair reading of the Trice claims indicates that Trice's invention 
consisted of a method of, not an apparatus for, laying underground 
pipe by projecting any collimated narrow beam of light through 
pipes as a reference line, the intercept of which with a translucent 
target provides a guide for the laying of such pipes. We find no real 
dispute in the record of the fact that the laser beam used by the 
defendants was a collimated narrow beam of light.234
 By using more generic language like “collimated beam of light” 
and by explicitly describing how the technology of the time could be 
adapted to produce a source of collimated light,235 the inventor dis-
closed important functions that the light source should satisfy. In 
those few words, the inventor disclosed an invention that was broad-
er than the exact method and particular equipment available at the 
time the patent was filed. As “to the collimated beam of light,” the 
invention disclosed in the patent in Laser Alignment was broad 
enough to encompass a method that employed a laser.  
 In short, the current, seemingly confusing state of after-arising 
patent scope can be explained and rationalized as simply an attempt 
to allow the patentee to receive the full scope of their disclosed inven-
tion. For broad inventorship this means, at times, allowing claim scope 
to grow to include some after-arising technology. For narrow inventor-
ship though, patent law should generally avoid allowing patent scope 
from reaching after-arising embodiments. In either case, patent law 
is just trying to protect the invention disclosed in the patent. 
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V. NORMATIVE PATENT POLICY AND LIMITING  
SCOPE TO THE INVENTION 
 Arguing that the invention, and thereby patent scope, is limited to 
the set of embodiments disclosed in the patent raises important ques-
tions. Can that limit really be defended as a policy matter? The  
conventional wisdom surely seems to suggest that patent scope can-
not be so narrowly limited. Yet proving such an assertion is often  
much harder.236 
 But before considering the normative case for the invention as a 
limit for patent scope, it is worth emphasizing the conclusions of the 
past few Parts. Those Parts aimed to show that the invention was a 
more sophisticated and better-developed concept than is generally 
thought. Importantly, the invention was shown to be able to explain 
much of the variations in patent scope including variations in the 
reach of patent scope into after-arising technology. 
 And though many worry that the invention is too narrow of a con-
cept, the previous Parts showed that the invention could, in many 
cases, be broad. In fact, for a point of comparison, Ed Kitch’s prospect 
theory is often cited as the theory that provides normative support 
for broad patents. And yet in his foundational article Kitch laid out 
his understanding of the “hornbook rule” that an “inventor may not 
claim more than he has invented.”237 He noted that a patent claim 
could extend to:  
[A]n abstraction and generalization of an indefinitely large num-
ber of concrete, physical objects. Thus to illustrate from a nine-
teenth-century case, an inventor could claim a process of separat-
ing fats into glycerine and stearic, margaric and oleic acids 
through the use of heat, pressure, and water at any temperature 
and in any apparatus that would work.238 
This description does not sound that far off from the description of 
the disclosed invention provided here.  
 In addition to the descriptive arguments, this Part will proceed to 
provide the more difficult normative arguments that support limiting 
patent scope to the disclosed invention. To make that case this Part 
focuses on a comparative analysis: Should the patent system limit 
patent scope to the disclosed invention, or should it extend patent 
scope further to cover embodiments not invented or disclosed by the 
patentee? As will be shown below, there are strong arguments that a 
system that extends protection beyond the invention will be costlier 
                                                                                                                            
 236. See Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual 
Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163 (2012) (arguing that the current incentive narrative inher-
ently makes definitive policy planning impossible).  
 237. Kitch, supra note 42, at 268. 
 238. Id. 
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and there appear to be no additional benefits from that protection 
that could offset those additional costs. As a result, in addition to the 
doctrinal arguments made above, there is strong normative case for 
limiting patent scope to the disclosed invention.  
A. Limiting to the Invention: Reducing Costs Through  
Boundary Clarity  
 In their book, Patent Failure, Michael Meurer and James Bessen 
develop an empirical assessment of the patent system.239 Though a 
societal cost-benefit analysis of the patent system as a whole has 
been notoriously elusive, Meurer and Bessen set their sights on a 
narrower, more manageable cost-benefit analysis. They examine the 
costs and benefits associated with the one group that surely benefits 
from the current patent system: inventors.240 As the presumptive di-
rect beneficiaries of the lucrative patent grant, inventors should sure-
ly benefit from the patent system. Yet in a startling result, Meurer 
and Bessen show that for the average patent holder the costs of the 
current system outweigh the benefits.241 The patent system is failing 
even the one group the system ostensibly aims to subsidize. 
In diagnosing the reasons for this, Meurer and Bessen lay blame 
on the patent system’s inability to provide clear public notice of pa-
tent boundaries. They argue that the doctrines that determine patent 
scope are “unpredictable.”242 Claims and patent scope have become 
what the Supreme Court long ago feared: “a nose of wax which may 
be turned and twisted in any direction.”243 Meurer and Bessen note 
that today “[t]here is . . . no reliable way of determining patent 
boundaries short of litigation.”244 Not only are the boundaries unclear 
and “fuzzy,”245 but also many areas of technology are burdened with 
numerous broad and—more importantly—overlapping patents. Every 
one of these overlapping patents arms each patent holder with the 
right to hold-up the underlying productive activity. With patent trials 
regularly costing millions of dollars in legal fees, even inventors ap-
pear to be choking on the uncertainty and excess of the current pa-
tent system. They conclude that, “the main goal of [patent] reform 
should be to improve patent notice.”246
As I have argued here and elsewhere, confining a patent’s exclu-
sive rights to the disclosed invention (i.e. the set of embodiments dis-
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 240. Id. at 3-4. 
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2012]  FINDING INVENTION 101 
closed in the patent) will help the efficiency and clarity of patent 
law’s public notice function.247 The rule helps provide more predicta-
ble and stable claim interpretation as claims would be interpreted to 
circumscribe only embodiments disclosed. As boundary vagueness is 
one of the major contributors to patent law’s current problems, this 
improved boundary delineation is an important advance. 
B. No Certain Benefits Beyond the Invention  
Concluding, as the previous Part did, that there are additional 
costs to extending patent protection beyond the invention does not 
end the discussion. If that broader patent system could show that it 
also provides additional offsetting benefits above and beyond its ad-
ditional costs, then such a broad theory could still be supported on 
policy grounds.248 Indeed many worry that a narrower system just 
cannot provide the same benefits of the broader system.249   
 This Part goes looking for those benefits and cannot find them. As 
the patent system is generally seen as a system for providing incen-
tives to inventors, this comparative benefit analysis first considers 
the aggregate incentives provided to inventors as whole. When look-
ing at the collective group of inventors, this Part finds that there is 
no benefit from the broader system. Different specific inventors will 
benefit from that broad protection (namely those who are lucky 
enough to get those broad claims), but in aggregate the class of in-
ventors is no better off with broader protection.  
In other words, patent protection beyond the actual invention is 
just a wealth transfer among inventors. To see this, consider the fac-
tors needed to realize revenue from a patent whose scope exceeds the 
patentee’s actual invention. In that case, a revenue stream only be-
comes available when someone else invents one of the embodiments 
claimed but not invented by the earlier patentee. As that second in-
ventor begins to capitalize on their invention, the broad patent allows 
the first inventor to receive some fraction of that revenue stream. 
That revenue stream diverted to the first inventor is coming from the 
second inventor. This broader patent system only manages to trans-
fer wealth between inventors. On the whole, inventors as a group are 
no better off with the broader rule. 
                                                                                                                            
 247. See Liivak, supra note 9; see also Chiang, supra note 38; Cotropia, supra note 39 
(agreeing that benefits could accrue to using this notion of the invention but ultimately 
abandoning it for what he perceives to be both descriptive and normative ill fit). 
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From that aggregate analysis, there are sure to be higher costs 
from protection beyond the invention, and yet there are not any obvi-
ous aggregate benefits for inventors. Yet that still does not complete 
the analysis of comparative benefits. It is possible that the distribu-
tion of incentives between earlier and later inventors matters. In 
other words, perhaps initial inventors need larger incentives beyond 
their actual invention while later inventors need fewer incentives 
and should be obligated to subsidize the initial inventor. I now look to 
that possibility and find little support. 
C.  Do Initial Inventors Need More? 
One possible rationale for extending patent protection beyond the 
invention (despite its aggregate inability to generate more incentives 
for inventors) depends on a free riding argument. Perhaps the second 
inventor copied and improved on the initial invention. But for that 
initial invention we might not have the second invention at all. This 
could provide the basis for a narrative where initial inventors require 
more protection. Yet recent research has shown that only a small 
fraction of patent cases (about 10 percent) involve any allegation that 
the defendant actually copied from the inventor.250 Second-arriving 
inventors rarely copy from earlier inventors.251 In addition, if there 
were copying of the technological embodiments disclosed in the pa-
tent, then protection limited to those embodiments would be enough 
to police that copying. 
 Relatedly, broad patent protection has been rationalized on the 
reasonable attempt to avoid duplication of research and development 
costs. To the extent we worry about one inventor redundantly ex-
pending resources inventing something already invented by another, 
we cannot use that worry to justify patent scope beyond the inven-
tion. Later inventors, inventing in the space beyond the invention of 
the first inventor, are certainly not inefficiently reinventing the 
wheel. They are by definition inventing something that the initial 
inventor did not.  
 In short, though there are some worries about narrowing patent 
scope, there are no verifiable benefits from extending patent scope 
beyond the invention. Yet there certainly are costs. Further recalling 
the fairly certain benefits of allowing claim scope to be drawn with 
more clarity and predictability, the normative arguments for extend-
ing patent protection beyond the invention are unpersuasive.  
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D. Beyond the Incentive Narrative 
 The above normative arguments are based within the framework 
of the current dominant incentive based narrative where the scope of 
exclusion determines in large part the incentives doled out by the 
patent system. In other work I have strongly criticized the intracta-
bility and inherent animosity generated by that view. And indeed 
because of that intractability, it is hard, if not impossible, to conclu-
sively prove that exclusion over the “patented invention” will provide 
incentives that delivers the optimal amount of incentive activity. As 
discussed above, the best that can be done is a comparative analysis. 
In recent work I have suggested abandoning the incentive narrative 
and instead consider the patent system as backing a market in in-
ventions;252 an inherent feature of that narrative is exclusion that 
need not extend beyond the patented invention. In short, in that nar-
rative patent scope need not be justified as the optimal balance of 
costs and benefits from exclusion.253
VI. CONCLUSION
 The invention is a critically important concept for patent law gen-
erally and especially for patent scope. As shown above, the historic 
notions of the invention, and in particular its interaction with the 
principle of the invention, are up to this challenge. It can provide a 
conceptual framework for drawing predictable patent boundaries 
while still granting descriptively accurate patent scope. By thinking 
of inventions as existing along a continuum between broad and nar-
row inventorship, determined by the number of embodiments dis-
closed, the invention can explain the large variation in patent scope 
decisions. It can provide objective evidence for patent scope while still 
allowing patent scope to encompass after-arising technology. The in-
vention can provide much needed clarity and predictability to patent  
scope determinations. 
                                                                                                                            
252. See Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, BROOK. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013). 
 253. See id.
